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Preface
Decentralization of schools is truly a global phenomenon. Nations as
large as India and as tiny as Burkina Faso are doing it. Decentralization
has been fostered by democratic governments in Australia and Spain
and by an autocratic military regime in Argentina. It takes forms rang-
ing from elected school boards in Chicago to school clusters in
Cambodia to vouchers in Chile.
This global fascination with decentralization has manifold roots.
Business leaders have discovered the limitations of large, centralized
bureaucracies in dealing with rapidly changing market conditions. The
collapse of the Soviet Union and the struggles of other socialist states
have weakened faith in centralized states and increased the pressure for
democratization. The worldwide recessions of the late 1980s and early
1990s have drawn attention to the crucial role of education in building
sound economies, and experience has shown that many centralized
systems of education are simply not working. A global debate about the
proper role of the state has led to more emphasis on the concepts of free
markets, competition, and even privatization.
Decentralization of schools is a complex process that can result in
major changes in the way school systems go about making policy, gen-
erating revenues, spending funds, training teachers, designing curric-
ula, and managing local schools. Inherent in such changes are funda-
mental shifts in the values that undergird public education-values
that concern the relationships of students and parents to schools, the
relationships of communities to central government, and, indeed, the
very meaning and purpose of public education.
School decentralization is also a highly political process. By defi-
nition, it involves substantial shiffs-or at least the perception of
shifts-in power. It affects the influence and livelihood of important
groups such as teachers and their unions. Education is critical to
national economic development, and school systems are vehicles for
enhancing political influence and for carrying out the programs and
objectives of those in power. School decentralization schemes often
succeed or fail for reasons that have more to do with politics than
with technical design.
v
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This book is designed to assist political and educational policy-
makers and practitioners in developing countries, as well as staff
members of donor agencies and nongovernmental organizations and
other outsiders who are seeking to help such countries move toward
the goal of education for all. Its purpose is to identify the political
dimensions of decentralization and to heighten sensitivity to them.
Decentralization programs will vary widely from country to country,
but there are common threads and, above all, fundamental questions
to be asked in all situations.
This book covers the following themes and topics:
* A case study of school decentralization. The first chapter tells the story
of how one country, Colombia, went about decentralizing its
schools and then adjusting this policy over a period of more than
two decades. Colombia's experience demonstrates that decentral-
ization is a complex enterprise and that the road from concept to
implementation is by no means straight.
* Why decentralization is political. Understanding the political dynam-
ics of decentralization is crucial to the success of any decentraliza-
tion program. The second chapter defines and discusses the inher-
ently political nature of school decentralization.
e Why countries decentralize. National leaders have many reasons for
decentralizing, most of which have little to do with the improve-
ment of learning. The third chapter describes nine countries that
decentralized-for nine different reasons.
* What does decentralization accomplish? The fourth chapter is a brief
survey of what we know about the effects of school decentralization
on learning, administrative efficiency, school finance, and equity.
One conclusion is that school decentralization, in and of itself, is no
panacea. It can be a political success but still do nothing to improve
teaching and learning, and it can have undesirable side effects, such
as widening the gaps between rich and poor. It is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for improving teaching and learning.
* The importance of developing consensus. If school decentralization is
going to have a positive impact on learning without exacerbating
problems of equity, it is important to involve as many stakeholders
in the process as possible. The fifth chapter looks at the problems
and possibilities inherent in building consensus.
* How to build consensus. Not many countries have tried to build
broad public consensus around school decentralization, but the
experience of those that have done so offers some practical lessons.
This is the subject of the final chapter.
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The Story of Decentralization
in Colombia
The story of school decentralization in Colombia reflects the experi-
ences of many countries, not only in Latin America but also in Africa,
Asia, and elsewhere. It offers a prime example of a country where
national leaders saw school decentralization as a means to achieve a
political goal-in this case stability and legitimacy for the central gov-
ernment-and where the educational impact was, at best, mixed.
Colombia is also an example of a nation where decentralization was
carried out by leaders with little interest in building popular support
among those directly affected by the change, including teachers.
In the late 1980s Colombia was a nation on the brink of political,
economic, and social collapse. The corrupting influence of warring
drug cartels was pervasive. Both leftist and rightist terrorist guerrilla
armies roamed the country, and the assassination of politicians, police
officers, journalists, and even college professors and school principals
was an almost daily occurrence. Political leaders realized that some-
thing had to be done to restore stability and order to their violence-
torn nation of 30 million. The first step was to restore credibility to the
government itself.
The path chosen by Colombia was to undertake a major shift of
power from the central government, which had exercised ironclad
control over the political process, to political, economic, and other
institutions on the periphery. By giving ordinary citizens a greater role
in managing public institutions, the reasoning went, it would be pos-
sible to reestablish the legitimacy of those institutions.
The first step toward decentralization came in 1985 with the deci-
sion to allow popular election of the mayors of Colombia's 1,024
municipalities and, shortly afterward, of the thirty-three governors of
states. In 1989 the Congress approved legislation giving municipalities
a greater role in basic services, such as education and health. In 1990
when President Cesar Gaviria took office, a comprehensive economic
reform package was enacted that reduced central regulation of trade
and finance and encouraged privatization of service in fields such as
I
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roads and electrical power. These efforts culminated in 1991 with the
drafting of a new constitution that codified the earlier piecemeal
changes and introduced other measures to promote democratic ideas
and procedures. A central objective of the decentralization effort was
to break up what has been described as the "oligarchical democracy,"
(Hanson 1995b, 103) under which Colombia was controlled by politi-
cal elites of both the Conservative and Liberal Parties and powerful
special interests, such as the Roman Catholic Church.
The decentralization of education was an important element of this
strategy for pulling Colombia back from the brink of chaos. Like all
other major social institutions, education was tightly controlled from
the center. The Ministry of Education in BogotA held the purse strings
for education and made all important decisions regarding curricula,
textbooks, and other matters of educational policy. Teachers were
employees of the central government, and salaries were negotiated at
a national level.
Ironically, this tightly strung system was only twenty years old and
was itself created to correct the abuses of an earlier decentralized sys-
tem. Under the earlier system, put in place following World War II,
local municipalities exercised considerable control over education but
lacked the financial, administrative, and political wherewithal to gen-
erate revenues, manage schools, and deal with teacher strikes. The
centralized system, established in the early 1970s by the ruling
National Front, succeeded in improving educational efficiency and
putting an end to turbulent teacher strikes. It also ensured that teach-
ers were paid regularly. But over two decades the centralized system,
too, succumbed to hardening of the bureaucratic arteries and found
itself out of touch with growing demands for increased local autono-
my. It was also clear that Colombia needed better schools than it was
getting. Primary school enrollment was a respectable 86 percent, but
only one of two eligible students was enrolled in secondary school.
Moreover, the spending rate on education of 2.5 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP), while comparable to that of some of
Colombia's neighbors, was well below the rates of fast-growing Asian
nations. Thus was the stage set for another swing from a centralized to
a decentralized system of education.
The government's strategy for decentralization was a twofold effort
to "municipalize" basic education and to increase the autonomy of
local schools. The first objective was to be reached by transferring
financial resources to municipalities and departments; the second, by
giving schools responsibility for managing personnel, designing
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aspects of the curriculum, and controlling aspects of finance. Parents,
teachers, and students were to gain a greater voice in running schools.
Inspectors from Bogota were eliminated, and educational planning
was to become a bottom-up rather than a top-down affair.
The politics of decentralizing Colombia's highly centralized school
bureaucracy turned out to be complicated indeed. During the consti-
tutional convention, delegates resisted pressures to commit the central
government to money transfers that, they argued, could not be sus-
tained in the long run. Eventually they agreed to transfer authority for
social services, including education, to municipalities and depart-
ments, with appropriate increases in the transfer of funds from the
central government and decreases in the size of its bureaucracy.
Writing the provisions of the constitution into law, however, turned
out to be a very different matter. The National Planning Department,
in agreement with the Ministries of Education and Finance, prepared
draft legislation in 1992 spelling out ways of implementing municipal-
ization, school autonomy, private sector participation in education,
and a voucher system for poor students at the secondary level. The
teachers union vigorously resisted these proposals. Well aware that
much of its political muscle came from its ability to negotiate national
contracts, the teachers union was opposed to decentralization in prin-
ciple and used its power to strike with great effectiveness. The
Ministry of Education agreed to compromise, and legislation was
adopted in 1993 and 1994 reflecting the political balance of power. The
powers that devolved to municipalities were limited, and local schools
did not get the autonomy to select, hire, and sanction personnel. Most
such decisions are made by educational councils in which teachers are
represented. A system of teacher evaluation was established, but mea-
sures of student outcome, such as test scores, were excluded. The cen-
tral government thus failed to obtain congressional approval for full-
scale municipalization of basic education and school autonomy.
The effects of the decentralization program were mixed. Whether
because of decentralization or because of a general increase in pub-
lic spending, by 1994 the budget for education increased to 3.65 per-
cent of GDP, which was above the target figure of 3.5 percent. Some
70 percent of the increase was directed to municipalities and depart-
ments. A voucher system for poor students was set up, and regula-
tions on private schools were removed. Yet, by mid-1993 only 70
percent of schools had been transferred to municipal control, and
the remaining 30 percent included many of the country's wealthiest
schools. Community members have been slow to exercise their
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newly achieved rights of participation. Many of the local organiza-
tions exist only on paper.
Several political facts of life help explain the modest success of
decentralization of education in Colombia. For one thing, the central
government, which pushed the plan for its own reasons, was by no
means monolithic. The National Planning Department and the educa-
tion and finance ministries were all involved but had widely different
interests and perspectives. The Ministry of Education lacks prestige
within the cabinet, and it has a tradition of revolving-door leadership
that undermines whatever professional competence it attracts. It has
shown a long-standing propensity to avoid conflicts, notably teacher
strikes, at whatever cost. In contrast, the teachers union, with 200,000
members, knows exactly what it wants. Its leadership, from the leftist
end of the political spectrum, maintains its authority by concentrating
on improving the labor conditions of its members and skillfully uses
the weapon of strikes to intimidate the education ministry and other
governmental agencies. The Congress could have enacted the legisla-
tion, but its members took the position that they would not do so in the
absence of an accord between the central government and the union.
Groups that were in line to benefit directly from the reforms were
notably absent from the debate. Most leaders in the private sector did
not attend government schools and do not send their children to them,
so they sat on the sidelines. Parent and community groups were not
well organized, nor were the mayors and governors, who had only
recently been elected and were unprepared to deal collectively with
very complex issues. Moreover, lingering distrust of both the central
government and the teachers union was strong.
In short, the decentralization effort in Colombia was successful in
providing legitimacy to the government and improving education, but
its impact was severely limited by the failure to obtain consensus and
the support of important players, including the teachers who deliver
education in the classroom.
Political Dimensions
of Decentralization
Education in both industrial and developing countries is inherently
political. Donors and others who promote school decentralization as a
means of improving educational performance must think carefully
about the political dimensions of what they are trying to accomplish.
They must also recognize that, in seeking to alter the balance of power
within national school systems, they are engaging in a political act that
will have both supporters and opponents.
Education is political because school systems are:
* Embodiments of national values. How well a nation succeeds in educat-
ing its citizens is central to national identity. Education systems both
mold and reflect a nation's values, customs, languages, and collective
priorities. Free and universal education can be a force for nation-build-
ing. It can also promote-or stifle-local, regional, tribal, ethnic, and
other customs and identity. How a nation distributes its educational
resources is a barometer of its commitment to equity and justice.
* A source of political power. Schools claim a high proportion of the
national budget and employ large numbers of people. The authori-
ty to hire, fire, promote, and reassign teachers and other personnel
is a rich source of patronage for political leaders.
a Vehicles for exercising power. A strong educational system can drive
national economic development, and elements of the system can be
manipulated for political purposes. Textbooks and curricula, for
example, can be used to promote social and political ideologies, and
the stance that a government takes in negotiations with teachers
unions can have important consequences for elections.
* Political weapons. Because the design and management of school sys-
tems tend to benefit groups with vested economic and political
interests, members of other groups seeking to challenge these inter-
ests often choose to do battle over the control of schools.
In the recent statement of its priorities for education, the World
Bank (1995, 137) observed, "Education is intensely political because it
5
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affects the majority of citizens, involves all levels of government, is
almost always the single largest component of public spending, and
carries public subsidies that are biased in favor of the elite."
The political significance of school systems varies among different
stakeholders. Political analysis must take into account the interests of
important groups:
* Political leaders and policymakers. For those in power, the education
system is a means of solidifying a political base and carrying out
policies. Opponents can use educational issues as a means of win-
ning public support and gaining power.
* Ministry employees. The educational bureaucracy has interests that
may or may not coincide with those of the policymakers to whom
they report or of the educators they serve. Staff members at the cen-
tral office will seek to protect the jobs that provide them with a
livelihood and considerable administrative power, while regional,
district, and local officials have similar interests in their own set-
tings. In many countries like Argentina and Chile, ministry employ-
ees as a group have been allied with the political opposition and, as
such, have become political targets.
* Teachers. Usually the largest group of civilian employees, teachers
have a stake in maximizing wages and job security. They are often
open to changes that will improve educational practice and their
own professional reputations, such as more local control of instruc-
tional practices, but they are suspicious of changes that will jeopar-
dize their security, such as the elimination of central financing of
education.
. Teachers unions. While they obviously reflect the interests of teach-
ers, unions are forces in their own right with their own distinct
interests to protect. They have a strong stake in maintaining central
bargaining and such practices as a centralized system of collecting
union dues. Unions are typically allied with particular political par-
ties, usually on the left.
* Universities. Tertiary institutions and their faculty members have a
stake in the way teacher training is organized. They also have a pro-
fessional interest in seeing their ideas carried out in schools.
* Parents. At the primary level, parents are the ultimate client for
schools, and their primary goal for their children is quality education.
As a rule, parents do not speak with a collective voice, even at the local
level, and a major objective of many school decentralization plans is to
mobilize and empower parents to work for better schooling.
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* Local communities. Parents are the most conspicuous representa-
tives of local communities, but the two groups are not identical.
Local officials, for example, may believe that it is more important
to invest new funds in improving roads or the water supply than
in improving schools.
* Students. Primary students have relatively little power but consid-
erable stake in whether the system succeeds in delivering quality
instruction. Secondary students will sometimes become politically
organized.
Needless to say, all stakeholders tend to be loath to give up the
power that they exercise in matters of finance, hiring, curriculum, and
the other elements that make up a national educational system.
Politics and Decentralization
If education is inherently political, it goes without saying that any
effort to alter the way the system is organized and managed is a polit-
ical activity. As such, school reform is certain to generate discussion,
conflict, and political resistance. Even supposedly technical changes,
such as more rigorous certification standards for teachers or the intro-
duction of new pedagogical techniques, have political consequences
because they affect who gets hired and promoted and have an impact
on the status and professional life of educators.
Moreover, as Cummings and Riddell (1992, 7) have noted, efforts to
improve educational systems invariably involve trade-offs. There may
be conflicts between the interests of political leaders, such as a desire
to control patronage, and those of donors and other educational
reformers seeking to improve educational outcomes. Even among
those seeking to improve education, there rnay be disagreements
about the relative importance of equity, administrative efficiency, and
educational effectiveness. "The trade-offs of alternative policies set in
particular contexts must be weighted against each other," the authors
observed. "The decision to opt for one path rather than another will be
a matter of politics in the end."
Decentralization as a reform strategy is clearly political because its
stated intention is to alter the political status quo by transferring
authority from one level of government and one set of actors to others.
In this case, the short-term political losers are officials and bureaucrats
at the center, while the winners are their counterparts at the regional,
district, or local levels as well as, one would hope, parents, students,
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and ordinary citizens in local communities. The situation is far more
complex than this, however, because the short-term losers can become
long-term winners.
The obvious question, of course, is why anyone in a position of influ-
ence at the center would choose to engage in the outward transfer of
power. The reasons for doing so can be positive or negative. Competent
and secure leaders could make a judgment that school decentralization
constitutes good government and that it will lead to better education and,
in the process, popular support for themselves. Donors whose objectives
are improved education will work to encourage such transfers. In other
cases, however, the motivations have more to do with the preservation of
power in the face of overwhelming political forces demanding decentral-
ization. This was the reality that confronted leaders in Colombia.
Weiler (1993, 56) has offered a theoretical basis for understanding
school decentralization that has its origins at the center. National
political leadership, he argues, must constantly seek to juggle two
important but often conflicting objectives: maintaining effective
control over their policies and maintaining the legitimacy of its
rules. Centralization promotes control, while decentralization fos-
ters legitimacy. Under conditions of conflict, he argues, decentral-
ization can be a useful strategy for managing the conflict and gain-
ing legitimacy. The price, of course, is that it also results in some loss
of control for the state. Weiler also observes that the rhetoric of
decentralization can occasionally exceed the reality, noting that "the
state's interest in maintaining control keeps getting in the way of
serious decentralization."
Varieties of Decentralization
just as the reasons for undertaking school decentralization vary wide-
ly from country to country, so too do the forms that it takes. Indeed, it
is probably safe to say that no two countries have adopted exactly the
same model of school decentralization.
Bray provides a useful working definition of decentralization as
"the process in which subordinate levels of a hierarchy are autho-
rized by a higher body to take decisions about the use of the organi-
zation's resources" (1984, 5). Such a generalization, however, is only
the starting point. Planners in any given situation must decide what
elements of the system to decentralize (resource generation, spend-
ing authority, hiring, curriculum development, and so on), and they
must determine to what levels (regional, district, local, school site)
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they will assign each of these elements. Hannaway (1996) suggests
that when it comes to designing a decentralization scheme, planners
face a "Rubik's Cube set of possibilities."
If only because they have been at it longer, industrial countries dif-
fer widely in the degree of centralization and decentralization in their
education systems. Indeed, over the decades many have a history of
structural pendulum swings. In the United States, for example, whose
constitution does not mention the word, education was very much a
local affair up through the late nineteenth century. This decentralized
system was plagued by inefficiencies and local corruption, so in the
early twentieth century a movement developed to centralize school
administration under the leadership of educational professionals in
districts and states. Now, as the century draws to a close, this central-
ized system is coming under attack as being too bureaucratic and
unresponsive to local needs. A movement favoring decentralization
through such means as vouchers, charter schools, and school-based
management is gaining force. The lesson would seem to be that cen-
tralized and decentralized systems both have potential benefits and
liabilities. Every reform aimed at correcting abuses contains the seeds
of the next set of problems.
Most developing countries, however, have centralized systems of edu-
cation, often a legacy of colonial rule. In many of these systems, to use
Weiler's (1993) characterization, control was typically of more concern
than legitimacy. It is probably also fair to say that, since these systems are
relatively new, developing countries have not had the time to experience
the pendulum swings characteristic of older industrial nations.
Colombia, which has had one pendulum swing, would be an exception.
In analyzing the varieties of decentralization, conventional wisdom
makes two sorts of distinctions that are useful in analyzing the politics
of reform.
Political versus Administrative Decentralization
The first distinction is between political and administrative decen-
tralization. Political, or democratic, decentralization involves assign-
ing power to make decisions about education to citizens or to their
representatives at lower levels of government. Authority is shifted to
include people outside the system. Administrative, or bureaucratic,
decentralization, on the other hand, is essentially a management
strategy. Political power remains with officials at the top of the orga-
nization, but responsibility and authority for planning, management,
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finance, and other activities is assigned to lower levels of govern-
ment or to semiautonomous authorities. Authority remains within
the system (Williams 1993).
The distinction between political and administrative decentraliza-
tion is critical in devising a strategy for school decentralization.
Because it is essentially a management issue, a decision to engage in
administrative decentralization can be carried out without extensive
consultation outside the education ministry or the government as a
whole. Political decentralization, however, involves a multitude of
stakeholders, both inside and outside the government, all of whom
will have interests to protect or pursue. Political decentralization is
thus a far more complex undertaking that requires, among other
things, careful attention to the building of popular consensus.
Deconcentration, Delegation, and Devolution
The second distinction relates to the kind of power that is decentral-
ized. The weakest form of decentralization is deconcentration, which
is no more than the shifting of management responsibilities from the
central to regional or other lower levels in such a way that the central
ministry remains firmly in control. Delegation is a more extensive
approach to decentralization under which central authorities lend
authority to lower levels of government, or even to semiautonomous
organizations such as churches, with the understanding that the dele-
gated authority can be withdrawn. Devolution is the most far-reaching
form of decentralization in that the transfer of authority over financial,
administrative, or pedagogical matters is permanent and cannot be
revoked at the whim of central officials.
These distinctions are relevant to strategic thinking because-like
administrative decentralization-deconcentration and delegation can
be carried out as a matter of government policy without extensive out-
side consultation. True devolution of power, on the other hand,
requires widespread support from the various affected stakeholders.
A Matter of Balance
Given the Rubik's Cube nature of the options open to educational pol-
icymakers, the relevant issue is not whether to decentralize or not.
Elmore (1993, 9) observes that in the practical world of political and
administrative decisions no "absolute" values attach to centralization
or decentralization.
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Planners should seek the optimum balance or mix of centralized and
decentralized elements. The critical question becomes: what levels of
government are best suited in any given set of particular circumstances
to carry out what functions of the educational system? In general it is fair
to say that central authorities should concentrate on setting goals, gener-
ating resources, targeting resources to meet special needs, and monitor-
ing performance. Everyday management of schools is best devolved to
lower-level authorities, even to local schools.
While the principle of seeking the right balance of centralized and
decentralized functions is no doubt valid, it also begs certain questions
and must address certain political realities. It can be argued, for exam-
ple, that the hiring of teachers should devolve to regional or district
authorities or even to elected boards of local schools. Teachers unions,
however, are likely to resist any weakening of centralized systems that
allow them to maintain a united front in negotiating salaries and
working conditions. Similarly, theory says that curriculum develop-
ment requires a level of expertise appropriate to central offices, yet
there is a body of research showing that the professional interaction
that results when teachers in local schools assemble to write curricula
is a powerful force for improving education (Hannaway 1993).
In seeking to develop an appropriate balance of formal educational
functions, it is important to arrive at an appropriate balance of politi-
cal objectives and needs and to create consensus among the various
actors in support of this balance.
Several questions are crucial to this analysis:
* What are the goals served by decentralization?
* What are the interests of the various stakeholders?
i How can the goals be achieved in ways that take the various stake-
holder interests into account?
These questions are the focus of the next two chapters.
Why Decentralize?
The most important political questions in school decentralization have
to do with goals. Why is school decentralization being undertaken?
What do its backers hope to gain from it both for themselves and oth-
ers? What public vision is used to build support for decentralization?
What are the hidden agendas?
Case studies of decentralization efforts around the world demon-
strate that decentralization has been undertaken for a multiplicity of
stated and unstated reasons-political, educational, administrative,
financial. These reasons can be categorized across a wide spectrum.
Decentralization in Colombia was driven by the need for central
political leaders to restore their own credibility and to foster national
unity in the face of violence and chaos. At the other end of the spec-
trum is the decentralization taking place in the newly independent
countries that once made up the former Soviet Union. In many of these
countries the central governments, stripped of political legitimacy and
lacking financial resources, simply lost control of the educational sys-
tem. Decentralization emerged, in some cases virtually overnight, as a
way of filling a political vacuum.
In Hungary, for example, the 1985 Education Act authorized local
schools to define their own educational tasks and education system.
Teachers were given considerable power in selecting principals, and
the old centralized inspection system was scrapped in favor of a
more consultative one. Most schools are now owned and run by
local authorities with constitutionally guaranteed autonomy with
relation to the central government, whose main obligation is to
transfer funds to the schools in the form of block grants. What this
amounted to, in Halasz's (1992, 3) words, was "negative" policy-
making.
In Hungary, as in other countries of Eastern Europe, Halasz
wrote, "decentralization and school autonomy did not appear as a
planned response to systemic problems but rather as a reward of the
fight for political freedom." The resulting fragmentation has led to
serious practical problems. Local schools have learned to manipu-
late the funding formulas in ways that generate both more revenue
12
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and greater inefficiency, and serious questions have arisen about the
administrative capacity of local school officials. Such problems have
led to the odd situation of a decentralized system struggling for
legitimacy.
School decentralization occurred in Colombia and Hungary as a
result of crises-one as part of a calculated effort by rulers to maintain
authority; the other, to fill a political vacuum. In between these
extremes are a multitude of countries that have embarked on decen-
tralization schemes for other reasons. Following are short descriptions
of nine such countries, each of which had its own reasons for decen-
tralizing its schools.
Confronting the Regional Problem in Spain
Modern Spain is, as Hanson (1989) puts it, a nation of nations. Largely
through accidents of geography, it is built on vestiges of ancient king-
doms, each with its own linguistic traditions and cultural values that
have spawned movements for regional political autonomy. Centrist
and regional forces squared off in the Spanish Civil War of 1936, and
the triumph of the centrists led to forty more years of military dicta-
torship under General Francisco Franco.
As Spain approached the end of the Franco era in the late 1960s, a
series of student demonstrations and other events made it clear that
the nation not only had to wean itself from authoritarian ways toward
more stable democratic institutions but also it had to do so in a way
that took account of the country's regional problem. One possibility
was that three important industrial regions would seize on the oppor-
tunity of Franco's death to secede from the country. To neutralize these
threats, political leaders decided on a strategy of decentralizing gov-
ernmental functions, including education. The first step came with the
General Act on Education and Finance for Educational Reform of 1970,
which reorganized the educational system in ways that increased
access for children in rural areas.
Franco died in 1975, and three years later a new constitution that
brought democracy to Spain was ratified, taking note of the nation's
inherent diversity by devolving central functions to seventeen region-
al governments. These new units, called autonomous communities,
were popularly elected, and each received all governmental portfolios,
including education. Funds were transferred from central to regional
coffers through block grants that could be used for education and
other purposes.
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During the 1980s the Ministry of Education organized a national
debate on a series of proposals for reorganizing the new regional
educational systems. Based on the resulting consensus, a school-based
management system was set up under which local schools, including
government-subsidized private schools, would be run by school coun-
cils made up of elected parents, teachers, and students. Their author-
ity includes the right to elect school directors from among candidates
in the teaching ranks. The central ministry retained control over the
hiring of teachers and the authority to grant degrees.
The results of Spain's decentralization of education have been
mixed. Overall funding for education increased during the 1980s, and
it is widely believed that the overall condition of education has
improved. Yet, many school councils have been slow to assert them-
selves in the management of schools, and talented teachers have been
reluctant to take on the responsibilities of school directorships, largely
because of a lack of salary or other incentives.
From a political point of view, however, decentralization of educa-
tion in Spain was a huge success. A strong consensus was forged
among political leaders of various parties to put country before party
to avoid the chaos that they all remembered from the days of the Civil
War. It was thus critical to the peaceful and orderly transition from
authoritarian to democratic government that has been described as the
miracle of Spain.
Promoting Local Autonomy in Brazil
In the early 1990s the state of Minas Gerais in northeastern Brazil was
enrolling almost all of its young children in first grade, but the quality
of education they received was low. Inadequate funding, poorly
trained teachers, rigid pedagogies, and overregulated management all
contributed to low student test scores and high repetition and dropout
rates. Only 40 percent of students were completing all eight grades of
primary school.
A new government decided that the road to quality education lay in
giving local communities a greater say in running their schools. A
series of measures were enacted to grant financial, administrative, and
pedagogical autonomy to elected boards in each school composed of
teachers, parents, and students over the age of sixteen. Each school
receives a grant based on enrollment and special needs, and it is up to
the board to decide in a democratic fashion how to spend these funds
as well as other monies raised locally. The boards also set short- and
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long-term goals for their schools and make the decisions on curricu-
lum, pedagogy, the school calendar, and other matters necessary to
meet these goals. Other important functions were maintained at the
central level, including centralized bargaining between the teachers
union and the government. Union support was also gained by pre-
serving the system under which the ministry withholds dues and
passes them on to the national union.
To overcome the long-standing tradition of patronage in appoint-
ments, the new system calls for new principals to be elected for three-
year terms by the entire school community. Voting is by secret ballot
from a shortlist of three candidates who score highest on a series of
examinations. Each finalist prepares a three-year plan and presents it
to the community. Planners took pains to develop consensus among
various interested parties, such as churches, the academic community,
and government workers. Citizen response to the new system has
been positive. Eighty-five percent of primary schools now have elect-
ed principals, and nearly 900,000 people, or 228 per school, turned out
for the second round of voting in 1993.
The performance of the boards has varied widely. Little attention
was given to training boards in conflict resolution, and in many cases
principals continue to dominate the process. Some boards, however,
have shown considerable independence. When the principal of State
School Pedro 11 decided to establish a school uniform, for example, the
board overrode her decision. Parent members of the board hold office
hours before meetings to solicit the questions and views of their con-
stituents. Everyone is permitted to join in the discussion before the
board votes.
The twofold program of school autonomy and greater transparency
in decisionmaking has led to increased operational efficiency. For
example, schools that purchase meals directly have been able to offer
better and more diverse menus than those that have continued to
receive food from the municipality. Clientelism in the selection of prin-
cipals has been reduced, and one outside evaluation concluded that
"technical and professional criteria are now accepted by politicians
and by the educational community as the path that leads to the effi-
cient school management" (Lobo and others 1995, 30)
It is still too soon to evaluate the effects of the new system on stu-
dent performance, but early results are encouraging. Results of the
1994 achievement tests given to all third grade students show that, in
comparison with 1992, scores rose by 7 percent in science, 20 percent
in Portuguese, and 41 percent in mathematics.
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Cutting Out Middle Management in New Zealand
In 1988 a national commission headed by retired businessman Brian
Picot began taking a look at New Zealand's educational system. Picot
toured the country, and the commission solicited the views of all inter-
ested parties-parents, teachers, political and educational leaders, stu-
dents, and ordinary taxpayers. The result was a report called
Administering for Excellence that called for radical change in New
Zealand's educational system, and placed decisionmaking as close as
possible to the point of implementation. Picot's investigations con-
vinced the government that the existing administrative structure was
overcentralized. A follow-up report, Tomorrow's Schools: The Reform of
Education Administration in New Zealand (Lange 1988), called for the
elimination of school boards and just about every other bureaucratic
structure that separated local schools from the national government.
The recommendations of the Picot Report were carried out almost
in their entirety and resulted in perhaps the most thorough and
rapid structural reform project ever undertaken by a developed
country. One important factor was the level of consensus that was
developed before the reforms were initiated; another was the fact
that Prime Minister David Lange took over the education portfolio
himself, thus sending an unmistakable signal of its importance. The
reforms began in May 1989, and by the time they had run their
course, New Zealand had substantially reduced the staff of the cen-
tral Ministry of Education, abolished the regional level of adminis-
tration entirely, and shifted responsibility for budget allocation, staff
employment, and educational decisionmaking to individual
schools.
Under New Zealand's decentralization plan local schools are now
run by boards of trustees consisting of five elected parents, the princi-
pal, an elected staff representative, and, in secondary schools, a stu-
dent and four other people chosen to provide expertise or balance.
Central to each school's operations is a locally written charter that
includes mandatory sections on curriculum but otherwise lays out
locally derived goals. Funding still comes from the national treasury
on a per-pupil basis, and schools are encouraged to take their money
under a "bulk funding" plan that covers all expenses, including
teacher salaries. In an effort to improve educational opportunities for
disadvantaged groups, including Maori and Pacific Islanders, nation-
al subsidies are weighted to reflect the special needs of schools serving
these populations.
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Any change of this magnitude, of course, has brought problems.
Teachers, for example, have complained about the increased workloads
that result from their managerial roles, and some school board mem-
bers took office with inadequate training for their new responsibilities.
Predicted cost savings have not materialized, albeit for reasons that can
be seen as positive: many schools have opted for increased quality
rather than financial savings. Political and educational leaders have
been careful to develop broad consensus for each stage of the decen-
tralization process. After publication of a major planning document,
Education for the 21st Century (Smith 1994), in July 1988 the Ministry of
Education organized a four-month campaign in which tens of thou-
sands of New Zealanders offered comments through large public meet-
ings in seventeen cities and towns and through many smaller sessions.
One of the strengths of New Zealand's approach to school decen-
tralization was that the initial administrative reforms were followed
by pedagogical reforms that reflected broad consensus on the goals of
a national curriculum but also made provisions for schools to add local
components. For example, the Onerahi School, which is located in the
coastal town of Whangarei north of Auckland, adopted a curriculum
that includes outdoor activities such as canoeing, as well as study of
the coastal environment. Extensive efforts were also made to ensure
that decisions on educational matters such as curriculum content were
made by educators rather than political leaders.
Paying Teachers on Time in Mexico
In 1978 the education system in Mexico was highly centralized-and
highly inefficient. One out of seven primary-age students lacked
access to school, and in poor states such as Chiapas less than 20
percent of students were in school. Wastage rates were high, and new
teachers typically waited more than a year for their first paycheck.
Payroll mistakes could be rectified only by a costly and time-consum-
ing trip to the capital. It was obvious to policymakers that if Mexico
was to progress economically and socially, steps must be taken to
increase the efficiency of the school system.
Decentralization of education in Mexico was carried out in three
stages. During the first stage, from 1978 to 1982, management of the
education system was deconcentrated from the Ministry of Education
to thirty-one state delegations, one for each of the states of the Republic
of Mexico. The delegations were given responsibilities ranging from
budgeting and managing schools to the writing of curriculum and text-
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books. Revenue generation, the drafting of the national core curricu-
lum, and labor policy remained in Mexico City. These initial reforms
were carried out, in Prawda's (1993b, 5) words, "a la blitzkreig"
through a concerted effort by senior leaders, and they had irnmediate
and positive effects. Preschool enrollment increased, especially in rural
areas, as did primary and secondary school enrollment rates.
During the second phase, from 1983 to 1988, the government sought
to take the additional step of transferring the delegations from central
control to the authority of states. It failed, largely because of opposition
from the teachers union, which did not relish the thought of negotiating
working conditions and other matters with thirty-one separate govern-
mental entities. Resistance also came from staff members of the central
ministry who had their own vested interests in the centralized system
and had long-standing cooperative arrangements with the teachers. The
government, preoccupied with economic restructuring and other issues,
proved to be too weak to carry through on its objectives.
In 1988 a new government came to power and negotiated an agree-
ment with the nation's governors and the national teachers union that
permitted the transfer to state authorities to proceed. Thus it was only
in 1992-fourteen years after the decentralization process was initiat-
ed-that the full extent of the plan could be carried out.
The Socialist Spirit in Zimbabwe
Ziimbabwe gained national independence in 1980 at a time when
socialist political ideals were sweeping through Sub-Saharan Africa. In
keeping with the spirit of popular participation, self-reliance, and
democratic decisionmaking, architects of the new nation sought not
only to make services such as education universal but also to decen-
tralize public services as much as possible within the framework of a
unitary system of government.
Primary education was organized so that the central government
hired and paid teachers and provided a small grant for each student.
The Ministry of Education also designed the curriculum, conducted
examinations, and assumed the responsibility for training teachers
through regional colleges. The construction of primary schools, how-
ever, was left to local communities, and management was delegated to
a responsible authority. These authorities could be missions, large
farms, mines, or newly established rural and district councils, which
operated three-quarters of schools. The fifty-seven councils receive a
direct grant to cover salaries and general office administration from
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the Ministry of Local Government, Rural, and Urban Development.
They also had the authority to hire and fire teachers and to disburse to
schools the per capita grants and teachers' salaries paid to them by the
education ministry.
This system ended up with some difficulties. Teachers complained
about delays in payment of their salary, including the fact that some
district councils were retaining some of the per-pupil grants for none-
ducational activities instead of passing them on to the individual
schools. The central government also discovered that they were pay-
ing for a substantial number of phantom teachers. The overall quality
of education seemed low.
In 1987 the Ministry of Education issued a ruling that all teachers
would henceforth be public servants paid directly by the government.
The councils, backed by the development ministry, balked, and their
position was upheld by the courts. This led the education ministry to
seek an amendment to the Education Act allowing them to bypass the
local government authorities and to direct funds to new school-based
structures known as school development committees, in which par-
ents hold a majority of seats. The local district councils argued that if
they could not become the channel for the per-pupil grants, they
would not assume responsibility for building schools.
The result was a political impasse at all levels of government. The dis-
pute over who would control the per-pupil grants pitted the develop-
ment ministry, which supported the local councils, against the education
ministry, and their conflict was duplicated among officials of the respec-
tive ministries at the regional and district levels. The development min-
istry believes that the decentralization policies of the government of
Zimbabwe give them responsibility for the running of schools, while the
education ministry argues not only that the rural development councils
lack the managerial capacity to operate a decentralized system as origi-
nally conceived but also that power should be delegated to parents.
Neither side has developed a clear pedagogical philosophy for
decentralization, nor has either attempted to consult with the various
stakeholders to hammer out a consensus on the best way to proceed.
The impasse continues.
Downloading Fiscal Problems in Argentina
One argument frequently made for the decentralization of educa-
tional systems is that it can generate additional resources for educa-
tion-financial and other. By sharing responsibility for education, the
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reasoning goes, local agencies will be motivated to collect more
funds for education as well as to spend it more wisely and to moni-
tor results more closely.
That was the argument that Argentina's military government used
in 1975 when it assigned financial responsibility for primary schools to
the provinces under a cofinancing arrangement. The model chosen was
to make use of existing governmental machinery so that authority of
educational policy, including curriculum frameworks, would remain a
centralized activity but decisions would be carried out regionally.
The problem with this arrangement was that the regional officials
were not consulted on the new arrangements and did not want the
financial responsibility they were being given. They resented the fact
that they were being asked not only to increase salaries for teachers but
to pay for the offices, personnel, and administrative costs of the decen-
tralization mechanism. The teachers union and staff members of the
Ministry of Education resented what they saw, probably quite correctly,
as an attempt by the ruling authorities to weaken their power. The result
was a decade of financial chaos. Hanson (1995a, 11) described this "arbi-
trary" exercise of coercion as "little more than an irresponsible dumping
of financial and administrative burdens onto the province."
In 1993 Argentina took the subsequent step of devolving financial
responsibility for secondary schools from the central to the regional
level. In this case, both sides agreed, and the strength of provincial
governments offers hope that this step will be more successful than the
earlier decentralization of primary schools.
Laissez-faire Ideology in Chile
During the 1970s the military govemment of Chile came under the
sway of neoliberal economists and social planners, many from the
University of Chicago, who argued that the quality of social services
would be improved through decentralization and privatization that
would foster competition. A particular target of reform was the educa-
tional system, which was both highly centralized and seriously defi-
cient. Forty-three percent of the lowest-income children, for example,
had no access to formal schooling.
In 1980 the regime transferred authority for running schools from
the central government to Chile's 385 (Winkler and Rounds 1993)
municipalities and enacted a system of subventions under which the
government paid the municipalities a form of voucher based on month-
ly attendance. The changes reflected the regime's view that the politics
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of the past had ruined the country and that teachers as a group were an
enemy of progress. Thus, under the reform teachers lost their status as
civil servants with rights of tenure, and unions were banned. Schools
and municipalities gained control over hiring and firing, setting of
wages, and school construction and developed a stake in attracting as
many students as they could. They had little autonomy, however, on
matters such as curriculum, and few provisions were made for greater
participation by parents, teachers, or others in school policymaking.
The decentralization effort did not go according to plan. When dif-
ficult economic times set in, the transfer of schools to municipalities
was suspended, and schools were ordered not to contribute to unem-
ployment by laying off teachers. Old authoritarian habits continued to
subvert the principles of municipal and private school autonomy and
community involvement. It became clear that municipalities lacked
the capacity to carry out their new responsibilities, and the model did
not embrace any plan to modify school practices.
In 1990 a new democratic government came into power and put an
end to seventeen years of authoritarian rule. One of its first major pol-
icy changes was to begin a second round of decentralization. This time
the focus was on democratic reforms, including the popular election of
mayors, and on improved teaching and learning. The goal was to have
pedagogical decentralization at the school level while strengthening
governance at the central, regional, and municipal levels.
Teachers, who had backed the change in government, got back their
civil service status, job security, and the right to organize, and the pre-
vailing philosophy was that teaching and learning would improve
only if teachers recovered their enthusiasm to work hard. Local
schools were given more autonomy in curricular and other education-
al decisions, and teachers were given a voice in decisionmaking.
Teachers pushed for a return to the centralized system, but the gov-
ernment insisted on a more democratic form of organization.
Fostering Democracy in India
India is an enormous country with 900 million people and a diversity
of cultures that has produced a nation in which there are eighteen offi-
cial languages and more than 1,600 dialects. India has a long tradition
of democratic political institutions and a continuing stake in promot-
ing citizen involvement in political and social issues. India operates
under a federal system of government in which the twenty-five states
exercise considerable responsibility, including for education.
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In 1992 the national parliament, seeking to strengthen the effective-
ness df this federal system, moved to further decentralize the political
system. By constitutional amendment, it directed each of the states to
establish a three-tiered governance structure of locally elected bodies
known as panchayati raj institutions. The amendment, the culmination
of a long struggle, constituted, in Hannaway's (1995, 3) words, "a dra-
matic effort to reestablish the primacy of locally elected bodies in the
affairs of the state by giving them constitutional authority." The
change also sought to redress historical inequities, she noted, by
"explicitly identifying the representation of traditionally underserved
groups, women, scheduled tribes, scheduled castes."
Responsibilities devolved to the panchayati raj institutions-which
operate at the district, intermediate, and local levels-include elemen-
tary and secondary education. India's educational problems are enor-
mous, as is everything else in the country. Nearly two-thirds of the
female population is illiterate, and about a third of children do not
attend school regularly. Disparities in access and achievement vary
widely both among and within the states.
Decentralization of education is still under way. States had until
June 1995 to set up the panchayati raj institutions, and the first elections
have just been held, so it is too early to assess the overall impact of the
changes. The experience of states where these institutions have been
functioning for some time has demonstrated a number of practical
problems. In many cases, control of the new bodies has been captured
by local elites, and locally elected bodies frequently found it difficult
to take control of problems such as teacher attendance. The local tax
bases by which the panchayati raj institutions must raise their revenues
are often weak. Perhaps most important, poor people have been reluc-
tant to make their voices heard.
Nevertheless, Hannaway (1995, 13) concluded that India's top-
down attempt at "democratic decentralization" can be viewed as an
"investment" in the nation's future if it can be extended to all states.
"In the short run, there may be tremendous inefficiencies," she com-
mented, "but for many in India these inefficiencies will be well worth-
while if, in the long run, a culture of participation and vigilance
emerges at the community level"(Hannaway 1995,14).
Seeking Economic Development in Venezuela
Many developing countries have turned to school reform as the foun-
dation on which to base their economic development, and some have
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chosen decentralization as the strategy for doing so. Among them was
Venezuela.
In 1969 the Venezuelan government divided the country into nine
regional administrative territories and gave each of them responsibility
for each of the central government's major portfolios, including educa-
tion. The theory was to give these regional entities, which shared com-
mon social, economic, and cultural characteristics, considerable author-
ity for planning, budgeting, and managing, with the aim of turning
them into the engines of social and economic development. The system
entirely bypassed the existing government structures.
While conceptually sophisticated, the regionalization plan ran into
operational and political difficulties, including a lack of continuity in
leadership. With each new election throughout the 1970s and 1980s vic-
torious political parties made repeated changes in personnel and policies,
all in the name of showing their commitment to-and claiming credit
for-decentralization. Party loyalists would be promoted directly from
the classroom to senior ministry posts. Programs developed at great
expense of time and money were abruptly terminated before their effec-
tiveness could be evaluated. Hanson (1995b, 10) describes Venezuela's
1969 decentralization initiative as "the most elegant in design, compre-
hensive in coverage, noble of purpose and complete in its failure."
In 1991 Venezuela made another attempt at educational decentraliza-
tion, this time to address problems of inefficiency and corruption by
shifting responsibility for schools to the state governors. The latter, how-
ever, have refused to accept responsibility for all of the national schools
in their areas. They have demanded the right to accept only schools that
are in good physical condition, educational programs that meet mini-
mum quality standards, and teachers who meet minimum standards.
They have also sought guarantees of financial transfers, including those
for teacher pensions. As a result, the decentralization plan is deadlocked.
Effects of Decentralization
The previous chapter showed how nations embark on the decentral-
ization of schools for a wide range of reasons-educational, adminis-
trative, financial, and political. The obvious next questions are whether
these efforts have achieved their objectives or not and what are the fac-
tors that seem to make the difference between success and failure.
Educational Improvement
As noted at the outset, virtually all proponents of school decentraliza-
tion, whatever their stated and unstated objectives, claim that such
reorganization will improve the quality of teaching and learning by
locating decisions closer to the point at which they must be carried out
and by energizing teachers and administrators to do a better job. In
some cases, of course, improved learning has indeed been the primary
goal of decentralization, and there are positive results. Early reports
from New Zealand, for example, show that decentralization has had a
positive impact on student learning. Likewise, third grade students in
Minas Gerais improved their scores on tests of basic subjects. In Chile,
however, which is one of the few countries where good longitudinal
data on test scores are available, scores on the national standardized
tests declined (by 14 percent in Spanish and 6 percent in mathematics)
during decentralization (Prawda 1993a).
Researchers are quick to point out that student performance is
affected by many factors, including outside forces such as the avail-
ability of funds. In Chile the score decline could have resulted in part
from the pressure on the decentralized system to increase enrollment.
In general, researchers have developed very little data showing a
direct connection-one way or the other-between decentralization
schemes and the performance of students on standardized tests.
Administrative Efficiency
The administrative argument for decentralization is that centralized
systems are bureaucratic and wasteful and that empowering authori-
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ties at regional or local levels will result in a more efficient system
because it eliminates overlays of bureaucratic procedure and moti-
vates education officials to be more productive. Decentralization led to
increased operating efficiency in Mexico, where teachers are now paid
regularly, and in Minas Gerais, where school autonomy has led to
lower costs and better services in areas ranging from maintenance and
teacher training to school meals. Much of the success of Mexico's effort
to improve the efficiency of its school system was due to the fact that
the central government took pains to train personnel at the various
subnational levels for their new tasks and to provide additional help
when needed. Likewise, decentralization produced substantial reduc-
tions in administrative costs in Chile, where the number of ministry
employees dropped from 18,522 in 1989 to 8,305 in 1989 (Winkler and
Rounds 1993). Jimenez, Paqueo, and de Vera (1988) found that local
financing in the Philippines produced overall savings.
On the other hand, decentralization in Papua New Guinea increased
the operating cost of the educational system because the cost of adding
nineteen provincial government structures increased the payroll. Studies
in Jamaica found that school-based management did not lead to the antic-
ipated efficiency gains, primarily because of a lack of training on the part
of principals and their lack of knowledge of how to work with the local
community. Such problems are by no means limited to developing coun-
tries. Speaking of decentralization in Chicago in the United States,
Anthony Bryk observed, "We devolved resources and authority down to
the schools, but there was no infrastructure in place to support that devel-
opment. If we're to move beyond where we are now, we're going to need
that infrastructure-training for councils, training for principals, looking
at issues of incentives and accountability" (cited in Appleborne 1995).
Prawda also recognizes the need for "a lengthy gestation for educa-
tion decentralization reforms"(1993a, 262). Spain embarked on its
decentralization under a staggered plan that withheld devolution of
powers until a state was ready and willing to receive them. By con-
trast, Argentina attempted to impose decentralization virtually
overnight and failed almost as quickly. As with the impact on learning,
evidence about the relationship between decentralization and admin-
istrative efficiency is ambivalent.
Financial Efficiency
Other stated objectives of decentralization are to generate additional
revenues for the system as a whole by taking advantage of local
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sources of taxation and to reduce operating costs. Argentina provides
an example of the shifting of financial responsibility away from the cen-
tral government to regional and local bodies being followed by an
increase in total spending on education. As a share of total government
spending, monies for education increased from 16.6 percent to 18.7 per-
cent from 1975 to 1986. By contrast, spending on education in Mexico
declined following decentralization, in part because of the post-oil
boom recession. Municipalities in Chile increased their overall contri-
butions to education following decentralization, but part of the moti-
vation was undoubtedly related to a decline in the real value of the
vouchers received from the central government.
One difficulty with turning spending decisions over to local politi-
cians is that they may be more interested in using available funds for vis-
ible, short-term gains, such as roads or irrigation schemes, than in using
them for education, where the gains are less immediately apparent and
more long-term. During times of economic hardship, decentralization
may actually facilitate the reduction of financial resources for education
(Hannaway 1994). The failure of decentralization in Venezuela is testi-
mony to the fact that adequate and persistent financing of education are
also important for the success of decentralization plans. Rondinelli points
out that financial stability is a matter of both will and capacity. "In many
countries local governments or administrative units possess the legal
authority to impose taxes, but the tax base is so weak and the depen-
dence on central government subsidies so ingrained that no attempt is
made to exercise that authority" (Rondinelli 1995, 12.1).
Once again, the impact of decentralization on spending for educa-
tion is as much a function of context and external economic and polit-
ical conditions as it is a function of decentralization itself.
Political Goals
The previous chapter demonstrated quite clearly that, whatever its
impact on learning and operating efficiency, decentralization of educa-
tion can achieve political objectives. Decentralization in Colombia turned
out to be a practical means of providing legitimacy to the government,
and the system of subventions to municipalities in Chile served the ide-
ological objectives of that country's military leaders, as well as their goal
of weakening the teachers union. On the other hand, decentralization as
a strategy for economic development backfired in Venezuela.
Perhaps the most successful example of decentralization as a means
of achieving strictly political ends is that of Spain. In their investiga-
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tions into Spanish decentralization, Hanson and Ulrich (1994, 328)
found that "almost without exception" the people they interviewed
agreed that "the practice of school-based management was not an
effective mechanism for improving the quality of management and/or
education in the schools." Not only is there a lack of evidence that
decentralization improves student performance, but there is a wide-
spread belief that school-based management has actually constituted
an obstacle to school improvement because it has failed to create suffi-
cient incentives for capable teachers to take on the job of school prin-
cipal. On the other hand, decentralization offers incentives to those
who do become principals to improve teaching and learning.
Nevertheless, Hanson and Ulrich concede that decentralization in
Spain has been a success and is likely to continue. "The real contribu-
tion of school based management has little to do with improving
administration capability through decentralization, or establishing
new directions for educational programs," they write. "The true con-
tribution of school based management is symbolic. That is, it repre-
sents in a highly visible manner the practice of democracy at the local
level to a nation long denied that basic human right."
Effects on Equity
One negative consequence of decentralization has to do with widening
performance gaps between students in wealthy and poor areas.
Bringing about more equity-both in the form of inputs like money and
outputs like higher test scores-is not always recognized as an overt
goal of decentralization. Indeed, it should come as no surprise that in
many cases decentralization exacerbates existing rich-poor gaps. Local
areas with abundant financial and human resources are in a better posi-
tion than those with fewer resources to make maximum use of decen-
tralized power, and even where there are universal educational gains,
it is the wealthy schools that are most likely to make the greatest gains.
In some cases national governments have made the narrowing of
such gaps an explicit goal of decentralization. New Zealand, for exam-
ple, sought to use its massive restructuring of the educational system
to improve the quality of education for its Maori population, as well as
for Pacific Islanders and other underserved groups.
Prawda (1993a) found in Mexico and Argentina that regional dif-
ferences in preschool and primary coverage, repetition and dropout
rates, and primary-completion rates grew narrower during periods
of decentralization. He suggests that resources in Mexico were better
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targeted because decentralization produced closer management and
better information about subnational requirements. Argentina also
witnessed a decline in regional inequalities of about 18 percent after
decentralization even though the share of revenues from regional
and local sources increased.
A considerable body of evidence suggests that decentralization-
especially when it is successful in increasing the efficiency of the
educational system-can have the negative side effect of widening
the gap between the quality of education in rich and poor districts.
Choice- and school-based management plans, for example, may
serve to improve the performance only of children from high-
demand families. Decentralization theory holds that decentralization
will lead to greater demand for education, especially on the part of
those who were previously underserved. In Burkina Faso, however,
the shifting of financial responsibility for education to local control
increased not only the direct but also the opportunity costs of educa-
tion and caused many poor students to drop out of school entirely
(Maclure 1994).
The Chilean reforms highlighted the problem of educational equity.
Ricardo Lagos, the minister of education from 1990 to 1992, noted that
decentralization "did little to help poorer school districts overcome
their basic handicaps" and that poor school districts continue to show
low achievement on national tests of mathematics and Spanish. "If
each community ends up with an education that reflects its income
and power," he wrote, "decentralization can lead to increased inequal-
ities." Even in a decentralized system, he adds, the center must both
ensure minimum levels of quality for all schools and "provide disad-
vantaged schools with special support" (1993, 4).
To say that decentralization can increase inequity, however, is not to
say that it must do so. The fact that decentralization has often exacer-
bated inequities is not a reason to abandon decentralization. On the
contrary, dangers should be generally acknowledged and plans should
be made to minimize negative consequences. Central authorities can
take steps to ensure that poor schools have the necessary financial and
other resources to make use of the flexibility and other positive fea-
tures of decentralization. In practice, this means reserving a role for the
central government to monitor the impact and take compensatory
steps, such as special grants to low-performing schools, to preserve
increased equity as an objective of school reform. Colombia, for exam-
ple, adopted a system of vouchers for the poor. Government action
must take the form of ensuring a minimum level of quality for all
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schools and targeting support for disadvantaged students and their
schools. Building such a role for the central government into the
process, of course, is a political act.
Some Generalizations
Several themes run through these brief observations about the extent
to which the various goals of decentralization are achieved:
* Political objectives alone can be used to justify a decentralization program.
As demonstrated by Spain and other countries, it is possible to
achieve political objectives through decentralization without hav-
ing an impact on either the administrative and financial efficiency
of the system or the quality of student learning. While such objec-
tives are worthy and of paramount importance to political leaders,
they are not the primary reason that outside donors and other edu-
cational reformers pursue school decentralization. They are inter-
ested primarily in improving the overall quality of teaching and
learning and doing so in such a way that gains are achieved across
the socioeconomic spectrum.
* There are limits to what administrative decentralization can achieve. In
principle there is no reason to presume that the redesigning of the
governmental framework of a nation's educational system will, in
and of itself, lead either to administrative and financial efficiency or
to better teaching and learning.
* Decentralization can have a positive impact on the environment of
education. Despite the inherent limitations of decentralization, it is
reasonable to suppose that decentralization can create conditions-
a new environment, if you will-that are conducive to improved
teaching and learning.
If a country's educational bureaucracy is highly inefficient, even
corrupt, then decentralization makes sense as a means of providing for
a better flow of financial, human, and other resources to local schools.
A well-conceived decentralization plan can create conditions favorable
to administrative efficiency. It can, for example, locate various admin-
istrative functions-revenue generation, teacher hiring, curriculum
development, and so forth-at appropriate levels, and it can give citi-
zens and educational officials at all levels a sense of ownership of the
system. Likewise, decentralization can create a climate hospitable to a
well-designed pedagogical plan. But decentralization by itself is no
panacea for the solution of national educational problems.
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For these reasons it is important in designing a decentralization plan
to be aware of other factors that are likely to have an impact on its suc-
cess or failure. Effective decentralization will require a well-conceived
plan for the sharing of power. As a minimum, efficiency gains would
require a supply of talent and commitment at local levels to take advan-
tage of the new structure. Moreover, even an efficient resource delivery
system is unlikely to have an impact on teaching and learning unless
administrators and teachers also have a strategy for making effective use
of these resources. New Zealand is a good example of a country in which
decentralization was accompanied by a pedagogical plan designed to
make maximum use of the new governance structure.
In short, decentralization is appropriately viewed as a necessary but
not sufficient condition for the improvement of teaching and learning.
It can create an enabling environment for improved learning, but it
cannot, as an organizational strategy, ensure that learning will
improve in the absence of other changes.
* A favorable political environment is essential. As we have seen, one of
the external conditions that can affect decentralization-positively
or negatively-is the political environment. Political factors must
thus be built into the design of any decentralization plan that hopes
to be successful.
a One condition that is not always necessary is political stability. Prawda
(1993a) notes that in many Latin American countries-Argentina
and Colombia, for example-the constant turnover of ministers of
education has made continuity of implementation difficult. On the
other hand, one factor that does not seem to be a condition for suc-
cessful decentralization is political stability in the nation as a whole.
To the contrary, as Hanson (1995a, 9) writes, "It is precisely during
a time of great crisis that major national reforms become possible."
In Colombia political instability led to a demand-driven centraliza-
tion while in other cases-Ethiopia and Spain, for example-decen-
tralization was prompted by credible threats of secession.
d Alignment of political and other goals is imperative. Because the success
or failure of school decentralization as an organizational model
depends to a large extent on outside forces, it is important that these
outside forces be recognized and understood and that steps be taken
to ensure that they are pushing toward similar objectives. This
requires development of consensus among the various actors about
the nature of these objectives-in other words, a shared vision.
The Importance of Consensus
The third chapter noted that the term decentralization can have many
meanings. Some decentralization schemes are little more than admin-
istrative restructuring by central governments that retain firm control
of the system. Others represent genuine devolution of power from the
center to local communities with the aim of empowering such com-
munities, generating additional resources for schools, and improving
educational outcomes.
It is always desirable to have broad support for changes, and we
shall see in a moment how the presence or absence of consensus was
critical to the success or failure of numerous efforts. But whereas it is
possible for administrative-style decentralization to be carried out by
government fiat, it is impossible to bring about the legitimate transfer
of power without first developing consensus among the various stake-
holders who will be affected by the change.
The history of school decentralization is replete with examples of
countries where such projects failed precisely because of a lack of
commitment to them among important parties. Decentralization in
Argentina came a cropper because governors and other regional
authorities, who were not consulted on the issue, balked at having
to take over the financial burden of schools. Likewise, Venezuelan
leaders failed in their initial decentralization efforts in the early
1970s largely because, in setting up nine new regional administra-
tive territories, they attempted to bypass existing government struc-
tures. In 1991 they attempted to address inefficiency problems by
shifting responsibility to state governors, but the governors resisted
the idea of taking on poor-quality schools without adequate finan-
cial guarantees.
Leaders of Colombia succeeded in building school decentralization
into a new national constitution, but they had to water down their pro-
gram in the face of vigorous opposition from the teachers union and a
consequent lack of support in Congress. Montenegro (1995, 17) sum-
marizes the problem when he notes, "a fragmented central govern-
ment, lacking the support of the very same ones who were to benefit
from the reform, was almost alone in its quest for decentralization,
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school autonomy, private sector involvement, and parents' participa-
tion." The teachers union, he continues, was the "only effective inter-
locutor of the Government during discussions of Reform in Congress,"
and "the lack of effective participation of mayors, governors, private
school associations and other groups In the political discussions
ensured that the most progressive elements of the Reform were not
enacted."
Implicit in this situation was a lack of a coherent vision about what
decentralization should look like at various levels. As Montenegro
writes, there was no clear and coherent set of educational proposals,
and in the absence of such unity no rational distribution of tasks was
possible. The first few years of the reform process were thus dominat-
ed by power struggles as various parties attempted to shape educa-
tional reform according to their own goals and vested interests.
The top officials of Mexico's single ruling party pursued decentral-
ization with what has been described as an exclusionary policy that
not only ignored the wishes of the powerful teachers union but aggres-
sively attacked teachers as the enemies of reform. Rather than negoti-
ate with the teachers union, they sought to defuse opposition through
co-option by offering teachers jobs in the new regional structures.
Significantly, it was only when a new government gained power and
struck a deal with teachers that pedagogical decentralization was
finally implemented in 1992.
Similarly, initial decentralization efforts in Chile were carried out by
the military regime in traditional top-down fashion with no attempt to
solicit the support of parents, educators, or ordinary citizens. Leaders
also made no effort to provide incentives to the government employ-
ees whose job it would be to carry out the reforms. It was only when a
democratic government changed course, restored civil service status to
teachers, and struck a deal that the second round of pedagogic reforms
was enacted. This occurred despite the fact that teachers were still sus-
picious of school autonomy and preferred a return to the old central-
ized system.
In some cases the failure to gain popular support for decentraliza-
tion has more to do with cultural differences than with political strat-
egy. In his study of decentralization efforts in Burkina Faso, Maclure
(1994, 249) found that local control of schools was not able to bridge
what he called a "fundamental alienation between rural culture and
state bureaucracy." Decentralization presumes a collective interest in
formal education and a shared belief that schooling will pay off in eco-
nomic and other ways; but in Burkina Faso, which he describes as "a
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political economy characterized by peasant dependency and authori-
tarian governance" (1994, 250), any such presumption is unwarranted.
In the absence of substantial political reforms, "all measures aimed at
decentralizing educational administration and at inducing broader
participation in school management stand little chance of significantly
improving the primary school system in rural regions."
The history of school decentralization also contains many examples
of countries where leaders sought to build consensus for reform. Not
surprisingly, these happen to be the countries where decentralization
was most successful. A textbook case of building decentralization on a
base of maximum public consensus is New Zealand. There was gener-
al agreement in the country in the late 1980s that the existing system
was not as good as it needed to be, and the plan for decentralization
was first put forward by the Picot Commission, a citizens group that
based its recommendations to a large extent on conversations with
New Zealanders from all walks of life. The decision to push through a
decentralization scheme was made by a Labor government, but the
policy was embraced and carried forward by two subsequent
Conservative prime ministers. At each stage in the implementation
process, draft documents were circulated for public comment and then
revised accordingly. For example, after a first draft of the policy docu-
ment Education for the 21st Century (Smith 1994) was released, the
Ministry of Education then organized four months of public consulta-
tion that included public meetings in seventeen cities and towns and
smaller meetings in other places. Submissions received on the docu-
ment represented the views of more than 100,000 New Zealanders.
Because of such efforts to ensure a massive buy-in on the part of the
public, New Zealand became one of those rare places where a major
reform effort was carried out in its entirety.
Spain is another example of a country where leaders were careful to
make sure that consensus existed before plunging ahead with decen-
tralization. Political decentralization developed out of strong public
backing for maintaining Spain as one nation while at the same time
making provisions for regional autonomy. There was a collective will
not to revisit the suffering that marked the Civil War as well as what
Hanson (1989, 131) describes as a national "euphoria that linked the
promises of democracy with increased socioeconomic development
and regionalism."
As already noted, the various political parties put aside their dif-
ferences when it came to regionalization, and leaders were careful to
move slowly but deliberately in instituting self-rule and to make sure
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that consensus on autonomy existed in each state before it was grant-
ed. The three potentially secessionist states of Galicia, Catalonia, and
the Basque Provinces, whose citizens had already expressed a desire
for autonomy, followed a rapid route to greater control of their own
affairs immediately, while others followed an exceptional route that
required votes by municipal and regional councils and a popular ref-
erendum aimed at building and demonstrating popular consensus
for the new responsibilities. Six regions qualified under the latter
provisions.
As a result of the dramatic political changes, education in Spain was
no longer an enterprise that reflected only the views of a socioeco-
nomic elite, the Roman Catholic Church, the military, and educational
bureaucrats. When the Ministry of Education set out in the 1980s to
make reforms affecting the regional educational systems, it organized
what Hanson (1989,135) terms a "national debate" that included well-
publicized open meetings where parents, teachers, students, and
interested citizens could make their views known. The result was that,
when it came to educational policy, the forces of national unity tended
to triumph over the centrifugal forces of regionalism. "These efforts
toward negotiated national consensus have proven considerably more
acceptable to the regions that jealously guard their quasi-autonomy
than techniques involving more direct intervention," writes Hanson.
"The Spanish approach to policy changes that impact on the decen-
tralized regions is slow, inefficient, often out of control (and in the
streets)," he notes, "but it appears particularly suited to a new democ-
ratic order that is still feeling its way" (1989, 135-36).
Other countries have organized national debates as a prelude to
school decentralization. In Ghana the process of national consultation
extended from the head of state down to every community through a
series of town meetings. In Mauritius in 1990 (Bhowon 1996), leaders
organized extensive public consultation on a far-reaching master plan
for that nation that included strengthening school-level management.
A strategy paper was circulated for public debate, and a televised
national seminar was conducted on the plan to ensure countrywide
participation and consultation. The views of teachers were solicited on
controversial topics such as performance evaluation and their role in
curriculum development. The significance of this process, according to
one analysis, was to "move educational policymaking from the close
province of the professional educators (and government) to a more
open forum involving parents, vested interests, lobbyists, unions and
the community at large" (Bhowon 1996, 1).
Building Consensus
We began by observing that school reform in general-and decen-
tralization of school systems in particular-is inherently political.
The corollary of this is that decentralization efforts often succeed or
fail for reasons that are political rather than technical. Moreover, as
we saw, decentralization schemes can achieve political objectives
that, while perhaps worthy in themselves, do not necessarily trans-
late into improved teaching and learning. In most cases these
reforms were imposed by a central government as a matter of poli-
cy and without any attempt to develop broad consensus except, per-
haps, on the part of local and regional authorities charged with car-
rying out a very top-down decentralization. In some cases, the lack
of consensus took the form of outright opposition from teachers or
other groups. In many cases the success of decentralization efforts
was shortlived.
Researchers are almost unanimous in arguing that if school
decentralization is going to be successfully carried out and have a
positive impact on the quality of teaching and learning, it must be
built on a foundation of broad consensus among the various actors
involved and the various interest groups affected by such a change.
Experience suggests eight steps that planners and policymakers,
both inside and outside the system, can take to develop such
consensus.
• Identify stakeholders and their interests. A careful analysis should be
made of all the individuals and groups who have a stake in edu-
cation and of what each one is likely to gain or lose from decen-
tralization. These include the ruling political party, regional and
local governmental officials, ministry of education employees,
teachers and teachers unions, parents, university professors, and
professional associations, as well as outside groups such as
churches and donors.
* Build legitimate interests into the model. As far as possible, decen-
tralization should be designed to take into account the major
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concerns of the various stakeholders. For example, teachers might
be persuaded to take on the burdens of shared decisionmaking
and accept the uncertainties of local accountability so long as
their financial security was assured through a continuation of
centralized salary negotiations.
•Organize public discussion. The most successful decentralization
programs have been those that were accompanied by widespread
public discussion-and thus widespread understanding-of their
goals and methods. Individuals and groups will be more likely to
accept changes that are not necessarily in their own best interests
if they understand the reasons for the changes, have a chance to
participate in the debate, and believe that the process has been
honest and transparent. A national forum can be carried out
through the mass media, well-publicized meetings, organized
debates, publications, and other means. Public discussion should
focus on the goals of decentralization, especially its likely impact
on the quality of education, and planners should make conspicu-
ous use of feedback from the public discussion in planning the
next steps.
* Clarify the purposes of decentralization. An important thread that runs
through successful decentralization efforts is the existence of a
shared vision of what is to be accomplished. This shared vision
begins with clarity among political leaders at the top, who must not
only signal their ideas and commitment to lower levels of adminis-
tration but also be willing to work with local organizations that are
outside the direct control of the central government.
X Analyze the obstacles to decentralization. Careful analysis should be
made of the problems that are likely to arise. These include not only
overt opposition from groups such as teachers unions but side
effects, such as retrenchment in the public sector or lack of capacity
on the part of local school committees. Strategies should be devel-
oped to address these problems.
* Respect the roles of various actors. In addition to recognizing the
legitimate interests of the various parties involved, it is important
to respect their respective roles. For example, political leaders
should respect the right of educators to make decisions on cur-
riculum or textbook selection. One key to the building of consen-
sus is for each set of participants to be respected for their partic-
ular strengths.
* Provide adequate training. Participants in decentralization pro-
grams must be prepared to take on their new roles and responsi-
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bilities. Thus, it is important to provide local government officials
with the training that they will need to assume new duties and to
give parents and other citizens the backup they will need to take
part in school-based decisionmaking. Parents need to be shown
how to take initiative rather than deferring to authorities, and
attention should be paid to the full participation of women.
Consensus is not possible unless everyone is in a position to pull
his or her weight.
Develop a monitoring system. The development of consensus is not a
one-shot affair. Rather, it is a continuous process of actions, discus-
sion, and corrective actions based on feedback from various stake-
holders. To facilitate this continuous discussion, it is important to
make reliable information available to all participants on matters
ranging from the goals of decentralization to its impact on stan-
dardized test scores.
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